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Comment on Canada  
(Prime Minister) v. Khadr (2010) 
Audrey Macklin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early in 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that Canada 
was violating the rights of Omar Khadr, the lone Canadian citizen de-
tained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Unlike the Federal Court and the 
majority of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada 
declined to order the Prime Minister to request Omar Khadr’s repatria-
tion to Canada. The Court did not absolve the government of the 
obligation to remedy the violation. Nor did it stipulate any specific reme-
dial action, or reserve jurisdiction to adjudicate a failure by the 
government to provide an adequate remedy.  
Canadian citizen Omar Khadr was 15 years old when he was se-
verely wounded and captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in July 2002. 
U.S. forces detained, treated and interrogated him at Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan for about three months, then transferred him to Guantánamo 
Bay in September 2002, where he remains. Khadr alleges in affidavit that 
in Bagram and later in Guantánamo Bay, he was subjected to interroga-
tion methods that constituted torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. Khadr’s allegations of abuse are consistent with documenta-
tion from human rights organizations, media reports, other detainees, a 
few former U.S. interrogators and the so-called “torture memos” issued 
by the Office of the Legal Counsel of the President of the United States.1 
                                                                                                             
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, co-counsel for interveners Human Rights Watch, 
University of Toronto International Human Rights Program, Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights. 
The author warmly thanks David Dyzenhaus, Richard Moon, Kent Roach and Bruce Ryder for con-
structive input and suggestions. 
1 The torture memos are reproduced in David Cole, ed., The Torture Memos: Rationalizing 
the Unthinkable (New York: New Press 2009). A subsequent memo from July 2007 was released after 
Cole’s book: “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High 
Value al Qaeda Detainees”, July 20, 2007, available online: http://<www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memo-
warcrimesact.pdf>. See also University of California (Davis) Center for the Study of Human Rights in 
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Khadr was held for five years without charge. He was detained for 
significant periods in solitary confinement. Although a minor, he was 
detained with adults. He received no education or treatment that took his 
youth into account. During his detention, the Canadian government made 
various inquiries and requests, most of which elicited no response from 
the United States. However, in 2003 and 2004, Canada requested and 
obtained permission to interrogate Khadr on several occasions for pur-
poses of intelligence gathering. In 2004, Khadr’s Canadian counsel 
sought an injunction to prevent further interrogation, on the grounds that 
Canadian officials were acting unconstitutionally. Canadian officials 
managed to squeeze in one more interrogation before the application was 
heard and granted in 2005.  
Khadr was charged with war crimes in 2007 by the Office of the 
Convening Authority for the Military Commissions. The offences were 
created under the Military Commissions Act subsequent to his capture 
and applied retroactively, and remain unknown to international humani-
tarian law. The charges of “murder by an alien unprivileged combatant” 
and “providing material assistance to terrorism” arise from two main al-
legations: first, that he threw a grenade that killed one U.S. soldier and 
wounded another on the battlefield on July 27, 2002; second, that he par-
ticipated in the assembly of improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”) in 
Afghanistan. Khadr’s case is scheduled to be the first case to go before 
the Military Commissions since President Barack Obama took office in 
2008. It will also be the first case since the Second World War in which 
an accused is tried for war crimes based on acts allegedly committed 
while a minor. Even if Khadr is acquitted of the offences, the United 
States claims authority to detain him indefinitely. 
Omar Khadr was 15 years old when captured, and 23 when the  
Supreme Court of Canada heard his appeal in November 2009. He has 
spent one-third of his life in U.S. custody, mostly without charge, and all 
without trial. His U.S. military defence team from 2007 to 2009  
                                                                                                             
the Americas, The Guantánamo Testimonials Project, <http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-
guantanamo-testimonials-project/index>; McClatchy News Service, Guantánamo: Beyond the Law, 
<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/>; American Civil Liberties Union, The Torture Report, 
<http://www.thetorturereport.org/>. Not all interrogators used abusive techniques. So-called “clean 
teams”, often composed of Federal Bureau of Investigation investigators, would interview detainees 
between abusive interrogations, and obtain the same or similar statements without contemporane-
ously inflicting torture, or cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment. Omar Khadr’s prosecutors 
intend to selectively admit into evidence statements made to the clean teams on the grounds that they 
are voluntary and non-coerced. Canadian officials went to Guantánamo Bay on several occasions to 
interrogate Khadr.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   COMMENT ON CANADA (PRIME MINISTER) v. KHADR 297 
(Lieutenant Commander William Kuebler and Rebecca Snyder) and his 
Canadian counsel (Nathan Whitling and Dennis Edney), waged an un-
successful public campaign to press the Canadian government to request 
his repatriation. Among other things, they devised detailed re-integration 
plans — involving separation from family, close supervision, as well as 
support and rehabilitation programs — in order to assuage any public 
anxiety that Khadr might pose a security risk to Canadians. A similar 
strategy succeeded in gaining widespread public support for the repatria-
tion of Australian David Hicks from Guantánamo Bay. Election 
campaign pressure induced Australian Prime Minister John Howard to 
seek and obtain Hicks’ repatriation. In the face of divided public opinion 
in Canada, Prime Stephen Minister Harper remains implacably opposed 
to seeking Khadr’s repatriation, despite evidence of the United States’ 
willingness to return Khadr if asked.  
Who is Omar Khadr? His identity in law is a function of multiple ju-
risdictional claims: under international humanitarian law (the laws of 
war), Omar Khadr is a combatant, possibly an unprivileged combatant, 
perhaps a child soldier. According to international human rights law, 
Omar Khadr is not only a human being, but was also a child — possibly 
a child soldier — at the time of his capture and his detention.  Under the 
United States domestic laws of war, as formulated in the Military Com-
missions Act, Omar Khadr is an alien unlawful enemy combatant and 
accused war criminal. An alien to the United States, Omar Khadr is a 
citizen to Canada. And according to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,2 Omar Khadr is everyone. As in “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and the right not to be 
deprived thereof, except in accordance with fundamental justice.” 
The dimensions of this section 7 claim were addressed in the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s recent judgment in Canada (Prime Minister) v. 
Khadr (“Khadr 2010”).3 Khadr’s lawyers and various interveners argued 
that Canada had violated Khadr’s right to liberty and security of the per-
son by conduct through a sequence of actions and inactions, that the 
government’s conduct did not accord with fundamental justice, and that 
the appropriate remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter was an order 
that the Prime Minister request Omar Khadr’s repatriation from his U.S. 
counterpart. The government denied the violations and, in the alternative, 
                                                                                                             
2 Part I of the Constution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3 [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr 2010”]. 
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argued that any violation had already been remedied by the disclosure 
order in Khadr 2008.4 It argued strenuously that exercise of the executive 
prerogative over foreign affairs effectively lay beyond the grasp of the 
Constitution, whether as a matter of substantive Charter provisions or 
under the remedial provision of section 24(1). Khadr thus brought to the 
surface the recurrent tension between the powers of elected officials to 
act in the name of the public will, as against the authority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada to restrain that power within the constitutional obliga-
tion to respect individual rights. Omar Khadr’s vilified status as son of a 
pariah family (dubbed “Canada’s first family of terror”) means that the 
risk of majoritarian tyranny is particularly high. There is no doubt that 
the government’s refusal to request Khadr’s repatriation enjoys a meas-
ure of vocal popular support. Apart from ideological motives for refusing 
to request repatriation, the Prime Minister could confidently calculate 
that inaction would not cost him votes, and action would be unlikely to 
net him additional votes. With no political motive to intercede, the only 
domestic incentive would be an order from the Supreme Court of Can-
ada. In institutional terms, the question was whether the Supreme Court 
of Canada would risk a political attack on its own legitimacy by requir-
ing the Prime Minister to vindicate the rights of a person stamped with 
the toxic label “terrorist”. The short answer was “no”. 
Almost two years prior to Khadr 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled in Khadr 2008 that the Charter applied to the interrogations by Ca-
nadian officials in Guantánamo Bay because it amounted to participation 
in a process that violated Canada’s international legal obligations under 
the Geneva Conventions. Section 7 required disclosure to Khadr of the 
records of the interviews, subject to vetting by a Federal Court judge on 
grounds of national security.  
Following the Court’s decision in Khadr 2008, Mosley J. reviewed 
the documents and ordered disclosure to Khadr’s counsel.5 Among the 
disclosed documents was e-mail correspondence within the Department 
of Foreign Affairs indicating knowledge that in the weeks prior to the last 
interrogation by Canadian officials, his U.S. captors subjected Khadr to 
torture in the form of extended sleep deprivation (“frequent flier pro-
gram”). This confirmation of Canadian knowledge became a springboard 
                                                                                                             
4 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Khadr 2008”]. 
5 Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 972, 2008 FC 807 (F.C.). 
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into Khadr 2010, which confronted directly the question of Canada’s 
constitutional obligation to seek Khadr’s repatriation.   
Before one even engages with the content of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Khadr 2010, the Court reveals its institutional diffidence 
through form. First, the judgment is very brief, only 48 short paragraphs. 
Second, against a jurisprudence that makes Canada’s adherence to its 
international legal obligations crucial in the context of extraterritoriality,6 
the Court does not engage with a single international legal instrument, 
norm or decision. Instead, it reproduces from Khadr 2008 a morsel of 
international humanitarian law pre-digested by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld7 in the service of assessing U.S. compliance with 
U.S. constitutional obligations concerning habeas corpus. The Court re-
fused to conduct its own evaluation of the conformity of the Military 
Commissions process with international law in relation to elements of the 
regime directly pertinent to Omar Khadr, none of which were addressed in 
the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Nor did it ad-
dress possible violations of international law committed by Canadian 
officials in their interactions with Omar Khadr. Similarly, the Court did not 
advert to international law or jurisprudence regarding remedies for viola-
tions of international human rights.8 In fairness to the Court, Khadr’s 
lawyers requested an expedited hearing and judgment. The Court released 
the judgment less than three months after hearing the appeal.  
My comment proceeds in the following stages. First, I will summa-
rize the judgments of the lower courts. Next, I will examine the 
jurisprudential basis for the Supreme Court’s conclusions regarding sec-
tion 7 and the section 24(1) remedy. I argue that the obvious deficiency 
in the Court’s judgment, namely, its refusal to provide a remedy, is en-
abled by a section 7 analysis that tacitly steers the government toward a 
specious remedial option that falls short of a request for repatriation. This 
judicial manoeuvre enables the government to comply with the Court’s 
expectation that the executive would act in response to the Court’s decla-
ration, while eliminating the risk that the executive might have to do 
something that could actually vindicate Khadr’s rights. It preserves the 
veneer of the rule of law, with none of the content.  
                                                                                                             
6 See R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]. 
7 126 S. Ct. 2749, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
8 For an incisive analysis of the actual remedy ordered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
from an international legal perspective, see Lorna McGregor, “Are Declaratory Orders Appropriate 
for Continuing Human Rights Violations? The Case of Khadr v. Canada” (2010) 10 Hum. Rts. Law 
Rev. 487. 
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II. JUDGMENTS OF THE FEDERAL COURT AND FEDERAL  
COURT OF APPEAL 
To summarize the judicial history from the applicant’s perspective, 
Khadr obtained a clear victory before the Federal Court,9 a narrow vic-
tory before the Federal Court of Appeal,10 and a hollow victory before the 
Supreme Court of Canada.11  From the respondent’s vantage point, the 
Federal Court trespassed on the domain of executive prerogative over 
foreign relations, the Federal Court of Appeal retreated but did not de-
part, while the Supreme Court of Canada wagged its finger 
disapprovingly at the occupant, and then left the building.  
Khadr 200812 had already established that the Charter applied to the 
actions of Canadian officials toward Omar Khadr, and that his liberty 
interest was clearly engaged through Canada’s participation in the unlaw-
ful regime in effect in Guantánamo Bay. This permitted O’Reilly J. of the 
Federal Court to move quickly to the issue of whether the infringement 
of the liberty interest accorded with fundamental justice. He ruled that 
the relevant principle of fundamental justice is “a duty to protect persons 
in Mr. Khadr’s circumstances”.13 He derives the principle from a combi-
nation of international obligations binding on Canada under the 
Convention Against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, broad principles contained in the Optional Protocol on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the specific circumstances 
of Khadr’s situation. These are Khadr’s “youth; his need for medical at-
tention; his lack of education; [lack of] access to consular assistance and 
legal counsel; his inability to challenge his detention or conditions or 
confinement in a court of law; and his presence in an unfamiliar, remote 
and isolated prison, with no family contact”.14 He concludes that the 
principles of fundamental justice “obliged Canada to protect Mr. Khadr 
by taking appropriate steps to ensure that his treatment accorded with 
international human rights norms”.15 
In considering the appropriateness of an order requiring the govern-
ment to request repatriation, O’Reilly J. comments that “no other remedy 
                                                                                                             
9 Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405 (S.C.C.). 
10 Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 2009 FCA 246, 310 D.L.R. 
(4th) 462 (F.C.A.). 
11 Supra, note 3. 
12 Supra, note 4. 
13 Supra, note 9, at para. 71. 
14 Id., at para. 70. 
15 Id., at para. 75. 
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would appear to be capable of mitigating the effect of the Charter viola-
tions in issue or accord with the Government’s duty to promote Mr. 
Khadr’s physical, psychological and social rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion”.16 Moreover, the government proposed no alternative remedy. He 
noted that many other states had sought and obtained repatriation of their 
citizens from Guantánamo Bay, and that the government had proferred 
no evidence about how a request would jeopardize its foreign relations. 
After reciting the range of potential diplomatic steps, from consular ac-
tion to the severance of diplomatic relations and economic pressure, 
O’Reilly J. describes “the presentation of a request for the return of a 
Canadian citizen as being at the lower end of this spectrum of diplomatic 
intervention and, therefore, minimally intrusive on the Crown’s preroga-
tive in relation to foreign affairs”.17 
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal (Evans and Sharlow 
JJ.A.) upheld O’Reilly J.’s judgment, but on a narrower conception of the 
section 7 violation. Canada breached fundamental justice by questioning 
Omar Khadr at Guantánamo Bay with knowledge that he had been sub-
jected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by U.S. officials prior 
to his interrogation. The fact that U.S. officials had perpetrated the abuse 
did not absolve Canadian officials for exploiting Omar Khadr’s vulner-
ability:  
[T]he principles of fundamental justice do not permit the questioning of 
a prisoner to obtain information after he has been subjected to cruel and 
abusive treatment to induce him to talk. That must be so whether the 
abuse was inflicted by the questioner, or by some other person with the 
questioner’s knowledge. Canada cannot avoid responsibility for its 
participation in the process at the Guantánamo Bay prison by relying on 
the fact that Mr. Khadr was mistreated by officials of the United States, 
because Canadian officials knew of the abuse when they conducted the 
interviews, and sought to take advantage of it.18 
On the section 24(1) issue, the majority declines to intervene in the 
exercise of remedial discretion by O’Reilly J., finding that “Justice 
O’Reilly considered the relevant factors in order to tailor the remedy to 
the facts, and cannot be said to have weighed them in such a manner as 
to reach an unreasonable outcome.”19 
                                                                                                             
16 Id., at para. 78. 
17 Id., at para. 89. 
18 Supra, note 10, at para. 54. 
19 Id., at para. 74. 
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Justice Nadon vigorously dissented from his colleagues. Although he 
evidently disagrees with O’Reilly J.’s decision that the principles of fun-
damental justice included a duty to protect Omar Khadr in the 
circumstances, he rules that in any case, the government had fulfilled its 
duty through the various inquiries it had made of the United States re-
garding Khadr’s welfare and requests that he not be mistreated.20  
Justice Nadon also addresses the remedy, and criticizes O’Reilly J. 
on two grounds. First, he characterizes an order to request repatriation as 
an extravagant judicial incursion into the executive prerogative over the 
conduct of foreign relations. Adopting the language of the U.K. courts in 
Abbasi,21 Al Rawi22 and Rehman,23 Nadon J.A. insists that how Canada 
conducts its foreign affairs should be left to the judgment of those who 
have been entrusted by the democratic process to manage these matters 
on behalf of the Canadian people.24 (Notably, in none of these U.K. cases 
did the applicants lead evidence that U.K. government officials had at-
tended and actively participated in interrogations at Guantánamo Bay.) 
Second, Nadon J.A. protests the absence of a link between the breach 
of fundamental justice as characterized by the majority of the Federal 
Court of Appeal (interviewing Khadr with knowledge of his prior torture 
and handing the fruits of interrogation to the United States) and the rem-
edy ordered by O’Reilly J. In a passage that presages the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s judgment, Nadon J.A. stated: 
With respect, I cannot see the link between the inappropriateness of the 
interviews and the remedy of repatriation, a remedy which is, in my 
view, totally disproportionate in the circumstances. In Khadr, supra, 
the Supreme Court dealt with Canada’s breach by ordering that it 
provide Mr. Khadr with the information which it had passed on to US 
authorities. Perhaps an Order could have issued prohibiting Canada 
from using the information obtained from Mr. Khadr, should Canada 
ever decide to prosecute him in Canada. That remedy would have at 
least some connection to the alleged breach. It might also suffice, in the 
                                                                                                             
20 Id., at paras. 86 and 99-103. 
21 Abbasi & Anor, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Common-
wealth Affairs & Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598 [hereinafter 
“Abbasi”]. 
22 Al Rawi & Ors, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Common-
wealth Affairs & Anor, [2006] EWCA Civ. 1279 [hereinafter “Al Rawi”]. 
23 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2003] 1 A.C. 153 (H.L.) [here-
inafter “Rehman”]. 
24 Supra, note 10, at para. 106. 
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circumstances, for the Court to grant, as Canada suggests, a declaration 
indicating which actions of Canada are unconstitutional.25 
The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal in November 2009 and 
rendered its decision in January 2010. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 
In Khadr 2008,26 the Court ruled that the Charter applied extraterritori-
ally to the actions of Canadian officials who interviewed Khadr in 2003 
and 2004. In so doing, the Court applied the exception carved out of the 
general rule in R. v. Hape27 that the Charter would not apply extraterritori-
ally without the consent of the state exercising territorial jurisdiction. 
According to the Hape majority, cooperation by Canadian officials in in-
vestigations abroad through means that would otherwise violate the 
Charter is justified under the principle of comity. However, “the principle 
of comity may give way where the participation of Canadian officers in 
investigative activities sanctioned by foreign law would place Canada in 
violation of its international obligations in respect of human rights”.28 
Rather than determine directly whether the regime in Guantánamo Bay 
violated fundamental human rights protected by international law, the 
Court in Khadr 2008 relied exclusively on judgments and dicta of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush29 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.30 The Court 
summarized the U.S. Supreme Court’s findings that:  
… the detainees had illegally been denied access to habeas corpus and 
that the procedures under which they were to be prosecuted violated the 
Geneva Conventions. Those holdings are based on principles consistent 
with the Charter and Canada’s international law obligations. In the 
present appeal, this is sufficient to establish violations of these 
international law obligations, to which Canada subscribes.31 
                                                                                                             
25 Id., at para. 114. 
26 Supra, note 4. 
27 Supra, note 6. Hape appears to have overruled R. v. Cook, [1998] S.C.J. No. 68, [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 597 (S.C.C.). 
28 Id., at para. 101. 
29 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
30 Supra, note 7. 
31 Khadr 2008, supra, note 4, at para. 21. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra, note 7, the U.S. 
Supreme Court identified the following specific violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions: non-disclosure of evidence to the accused; exclusion of accused from proceedings; the 
fact that the Military Commissions Court was not a “regularly constituted court . . . established and 
organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country”. In Rasul v. 
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In Khadr 2008, Canada’s participation for purposes of Charter appli-
cation consisted of transmitting the fruits of its interrogations of Khadr to 
U.S. authorities. The Court expressly refrained from ruling on whether 
the act of interviewing Khadr would constitute participation: “Merely 
conducting interviews with a Canadian citizen held abroad under a viola-
tive process may not constitute participation in that process. Indeed, it 
may often be essential that Canadian officials interview citizens being 
held by violative regimes to provide assistance to them.”32  
In Khadr 2010, the Court proceeds from this same starting point. It 
notes that subsequent litigation (Boumediene v. Bush)33 and legislative 
intervention had altered the Military Commissions process;34 indeed, on 
the day of the hearing before the Supreme Court of Canada, Khadr’s 
counsel advised the Court of the most recent changes imposed by the 
Obama administration. The Court declines to express any view about the 
conformity of the current process with fundamental human rights under 
international law, nor does it comment on the human rights significance 
of any aspect of the regime in Guantánamo Bay beyond those addressed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The Court simply 
reiterates that it is “satisfied that the rationale in Khadr 2008 for applying 
the Charter to the actions of Canadian officials at Guantánamo Bay gov-
erns this case as well”.35  
In Khadr 2008, it was not necessary for the Court to determine 
whether Canada had violated Khadr’s section 7 rights by interrogating 
him; the question was whether Canada had a Charter obligation to di-
vulge evidence that it extracted from Khadr, regardless of the legality of 
how it was obtained. In Khadr 2010, the Court was compelled to rule on 
whether the interrogations violated Khadr’s Charter rights. It does so in 
three paragraphs.36 It does not address whether Canadian officials vio-
lated his right to security of the person by the fact and the manner of the 
interrogation. Instead, it regards the United States as the sole violator of 
his right to liberty and security of the person, and asks whether Canadian 
                                                                                                             
Bush, supra, note 29, the Court said nothing about international law. Indeed, U.S. international law 
scholar Michael Reisman assails the judgment as “completely oblivious to international law. Indeed, 
none [of the opinions in Rasul] even discusses international law or the Geneva Convention.” W. 
Michael Reisman, “Rasul v. Bush: A Failure to Apply International Law” (2004) 2 Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 973-80, at 980.  
32 Khadr 2008, supra, note 4, at para. 27. 
33 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
34 Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at para. 17. 
35 Id., at para. 18. 
36 Id., at paras. 19-21. 
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actions were causally connected to the perpetuation of those rights depri-
vations by the United States.  
The Court struggles to infer the requisite connection. There was no 
direct evidence about the novelty or utility of the evidence obtained by 
Canada, apart from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s 
(“CSIS”) own assessment that its 2003 interrogations were “highly suc-
cessful, as evidenced by the quality of intelligence information”.37 The 
2004 interrogation was less productive because Khadr refused to answer 
questions. The Court obliquely suggests that the perceived success of the 
2003 interrogations might have encouraged Canadian officials to under-
take the March 2004 interrogation, undeterred by knowledge that Khadr 
had been subject to the “frequent flier program”. The relaxed rules of 
evidence for the Military Commission would make the evidence obtained 
by Canada following his subjection to the frequent flier program poten-
tially admissible before the Military Commission.  
The Court considers it “reasonable to infer” from the interrogation 
and subsequent information transfer that “Canada’s active participation 
in what was at the time an illegal regime has contributed and continues to 
contribute to Mr. Khadr’s current detention”.38 This satisfied the required 
causal connection between Canada and the liberty and security violating 
conduct of another state.  
The Court then devotes four paragraphs to the question of whether 
the deprivation of liberty and security of the person accords with the 
principles of fundamental justice. The Federal Court had identified a 
positive principle of fundamental justice, namely, a circumstantially spe-
cific duty to protect. The Federal Court of Appeal reasoned that since 
fundamental justice clearly prohibits inflicting torture to elicit informa-
tion, it follows that it would also preclude questioning a person with 
knowledge that he has been tortured by a third party to induce his com-
pliance. The Supreme Court does not address the Federal Court’s theory 
that the state owed citizens a positive duty to protect, nor does it respond 
to the narrower reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal. Instead, it re-
hearses its general criteria for establishing a principle of fundamental 
justice: it must be a legal principle, there must be a consensus on its 
character as fundamental to the fair operation of a legal system, and it 
must be sufficiently precise to “yield a manageable standard”.39 It  
                                                                                                             
37 Id., at para. 20. 
38 Id., at para. 21. 
39 Id., at para. 23. 
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reiterates the factors that justified the extraterritorial application of the 
Charter a few paragraphs earlier, adding mention of Khadr’s youth and 
isolation from anyone concerned about his best interests. Next, it de-
scribes Canadian officials’ knowledge, motives and conduct through the 
interrogations.40 In a single, perfunctory sentence, the Court concludes 
that the section 7 deprivation did not comport with principles of funda-
mental justice: 
Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most serious 
criminal charges while detained in these conditions and without access 
to counsel, and while knowing that the fruits of the interrogations 
would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, offends the most basic 
Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth suspects.41 
Having arrived at the finding of a section 7 violation, the Court pro-
ceeds to the final task of reviewing the remedy ordered by O’Reilly J. 
and affirmed as reasonable by a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal. 
The Court bifurcates its inquiry into two questions:  
(1) Is the remedy sought sufficiently connected to the breach? and (2) 
Is the remedy sought precluded by the fact that it touches on the 
Crown prerogative power over foreign affairs?42 
The Court answers the first question in the affirmative. The Court 
identifies a potential obstacle in the apparent gap between the breach and 
the remedy. Canadian officials took the opportunity to interrogate Khadr 
one last time in March 2004, shortly after his lawyers sought an injunc-
tion to prevent further interrogations and before the application was 
heard and granted. The illegally obtained evidence was disclosed to 
Khadr as a consequence of the Court’s ruling in Khadr 2008. How is a 
request for repatriation responsive to the wrong of past interrogations and 
evidence sharing? The Court bridges the temporal gap by declaring that 
the “effect of the breaches … continues to this day” because the evidence 
gathered by Canadian officials and shared with U.S. military authorities 
could be adduced at a future U.S. trial.43 A remedy is required because 
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42 Id., at para. 27. 
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the “past acts violate present liberties”44 and a request for repatriation 
“could potentially vindicate those rights”.45  
The Court also answers the second question in the affirmative — sort 
of. It spends about a third of the judgment (15 paragraphs) explaining 
why it can but will not order the government to request Khadr’s repatria-
tion.46  
The Crown prerogative over foreign affairs “includes the making of 
representations to a foreign government”.47 The Court states and restates 
the yin and yang of respect for the “constitutional responsibility of the 
executive to make decisions on matters of foreign affairs in the context 
of complex and ever-changing circumstances, taking into account Can-
ada’s broader national interests”,48 and the authority and duty of the 
courts to “make orders ensuring that the government’s foreign affairs 
prerogative is exercised in accordance with the constitution”.49 The Court 
had previously rejected the U.S. “political questions doctrine” in Opera-
tion Dismantle.50 Also, it explicitly subjected executive discretion over 
foreign affairs to Charter constraints in Burns,51 when it required the Ca-
nadian government to seek and obtain assurances that capital punishment 
would neither be sought nor imposed as a precondition to extradition of 
two accused murderers, Burns and Rafay, to the United States. Therefore, 
the Court could not evade the fact that principle and precedent authorized 
it to order a remedy that plainly touched on the executive prerogative 
over foreign affairs. Instead, the Court attempts to distinguish Burns. 
Without repudiating the principle holding executive action to constitu-
tional account, it hollows it out by offering two justifications for the 
departure from precedent. First, unlike the circumstances that obtained in 
Burns, “Mr. Khadr is not under the control of the Canadian government; 
the likelihood that the proposed remedy will be effective is unclear; and 
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at para. 31. 
45 Id., at para. 30. According to Kent Roach, this follows the Court’s general reluctance to 
impose strict causal analysis to remedies — for example, in rejecting the need to find a causal link 
between a Charter violation and the discovery of evidence when considering whether to exclude 
evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, rulings such as R. v. Strachan, [1988] S.C.J. No. 
94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Strachan”] and R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. 
No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 120-121 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”] have described causa-
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46 Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at paras. 33-47. 
47 Id., at para. 35. 
48 Id., at para. 39. 
49 Id., at para. 37. 
50 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.). 
51 United States of America  v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Burns”]. 
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the impact on Canadian foreign relations of a repatriation request cannot 
be properly assessed by the Court.”52 
Next, the record in Khadr’s case is deemed inadequate, insofar as the 
Court was not apprised of the “range of considerations currently faced by 
the government in assessing Mr. Khadr’s request”.53 Given the Court’s 
ignorance of what negotiations the government had or was having with 
the United States with respect to Khadr, “it would not be appropriate for 
the Court to give direction as to the diplomatic steps necessary to address 
the breaches of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights”.54 
The differences between Burns and Rafay’s and Khadr’s situation, 
and the indeterminacy of the record, underwrite the primacy given to 
“the need to respect the prerogative powers of the executive”. In the re-
sult, the Court decides that the “prudent course at this point” is to grant 
Khadr “a declaration advising the government of its option on the re-
cords before it which, in turn, will provide the legal framework for the 
executive to exercise its functions and to consider what actions to take in 
respect of Mr. Khadr, in conformity with the Charter”.55 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. Section 7 from Application to Violation 
One of the doctrinal riddles posed by the judgment in Hape concerns 
the relationship between the threshold test for the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Charter and the subsequent determination of whether the 
Charter has been violated. The animating idea behind Hape seems to be 
that international human rights obligations binding upon Canada provide 
a floor beneath which Canadian conduct abroad must not sink, either by 
direct action or by participation in rights-violating conduct by officials of 
another (presumably the territorial) state. When Canadian officials de-
scend below this minimum standard, the Charter applies. This 
immediately raises the question of what lies between committing or par-
ticipating in the violation of a binding international human rights norm 
and the violation of a Charter right. One must imagine the possibility of 
doing the former without also committing the latter, or else proof of the 
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threshold question also proves the Charter violation, and the two tests 
collapse into one another. Indeed, this is what happened in Khadr 2008, 
where the Court simply asserted that the principles of fundamental jus-
tice apply where “an individual’s s. 7 right to liberty is engaged by 
Canada’s participation in a foreign process that is contrary to Canada’s 
international human rights obligations”.56 In other words, section 7 is 
violated for the same reason that the Charter applies. 
Apart from deportation to torture — which international human 
rights prohibits absolutely but, according to Suresh,57 the Charter does 
not — it is difficult to imagine situations where violation of an interna-
tional human right binding upon Canada would not also breach the 
Charter. The Court does not explain what logic might drive a distinction 
between participating in a human rights violation (the threshold question) 
and breaching a Charter right (the violation question). In Khadr 2010, the 
Supreme Court appears to resolve this by invoking Suresh as the source 
of a supplementary requirement of a “sufficient causal connection” be-
tween Canada’s participation (the threshold question) and the U.S.’ 
deprivation of Khadr’s liberty and security of the person.58 The reference 
to Suresh invites us to construe Canada’s role as facilitating the violation 
of Khadr’s section 7 rights by another party (the United States), in the 
same way as deportation from Canada would facilitate Suresh’s torture 
by Sri Lanka.  
However, the analogy is inapt in two ways: first, the contribution of 
Canadian officials’ interrogations to facilitating Khadr’s ongoing deten-
tion in Guantánamo Bay cannot remotely approximate the “but for” 
causation that was present in Suresh, wherein Suresh would not face tor-
ture in Sri Lanka but for deportation by Canada. So, the Court strains to 
find a causal connection by claiming that it is reasonable to infer that the 
evidence extracted by Canadian officials and shared with U.S. officials 
contributed to the decision by U.S. officials to continue detaining Khadr. 
This seems highly implausible, and hangs on little more than a self-
aggrandizing assessment by Canadian officials of the quality of the in-
formation they extracted from Khadr in 2003. A more damning and more 
plausible inference — but one which the Court only hints at obliquely — 
is that Khadr’s upcoming scheduled interrogations by Canadian officials 
in March 2004 motivated U.S. officials to subject Khadr to the frequent 
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57 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
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58 Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at paras. 19 and 21. 
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flier program in the period leading up to those interrogations in order to 
make him more compliant.59 
While the reference to Suresh overstates any likely causal connection 
between Canada’s interrogations and Khadr’s detention by the U.S., it 
simultaneously suppresses the direct violation of his security of the per-
son by Canadian officials. The Court does not advert to the interrogations 
themselves as engaging Khadr’s section 7 rights. This seems odd. A deci-
sion by state officials to interrogate a minor citizen who has been 
detained for years by a foreign government under conditions of extreme, 
pervasive and unremitting oppression, for purposes of intelligence gath-
ering and law enforcement, with no regard for his age, health, treatment 
or welfare, would seem to exemplify state-imposed psychological stress 
severe enough to engage security of the person. Any equivocation on this 
point might be resolved by viewing the video in which 16-year old Omar 
Khadr pleads with the CSIS official for help, and then slumps over, sob-
bing and calling his mother’s name over and over, once he finally 
realizes the futility of his entreaties: Canadian officials scorn his com-
plaints of mistreatment, and have not come to provide support or 
assistance; their sole purpose is to extract intelligence.60  
Unlike the hypothetical scenario floated in Khadr 2008, in which the 
Court speculates on potentially lawful motives for interviewing citizens 
detained abroad in abusive circumstances, these interrogations were in-
disputably motivated solely by intelligence and criminal law enforcement 
objectives.61 Canadian officials displayed no concern for Khadr’s protec-
tion or welfare qua citizen and/or child. Nevertheless, the Court 
conspicuously refuses to address whether Canadian officials’ interroga-
tions of Khadr in Guantánamo Bay constituted a deprivation of his 
security of the person. 
Only at the stage of fundamental justice does the Court turn to the 
actual interrogations. Here, the Court finds that the means by which Ca-
nadian officials obtained statements from Khadr did not accord with 
principles of fundamental justice: Canada interrogated Khadr knowing he 
was a minor, who was detained unlawfully and previously subject to 
sleep deprivation. The record does not disclose what other abuse Cana-
dian officials knew, suspected or ought to have suspected. Canadian 
officials chose to interrogate Khadr without counsel, and with the  
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intention of transferring the fruits of the interrogation to U.S. prosecutors 
for potential use in a future trial. Yet the cumulative effect of these facts 
points to the very conclusion that the Court’s analysis resists, which is 
that the interrogation by Canadian officials in and of itself directly vio-
lated Khadr’s security of the person.  
Shunting the interrogation to principles of fundamental justice means 
that Canadian conduct toward Khadr enters the analysis only at the pe-
riphery. The actions of Canadian officials operate as the circumstances 
that made it fundamentally unjust to share the fruits of their interrogation 
with the U.S. officials who were in turn depriving Khadr of his liberty 
and security of the person. Not only is this convoluted narrative sequence 
difficult to follow as a matter of legal reasoning, it fails to cohere for at 
least two reasons. First, to conclude that Canadian officials breached 
fundamental justice by interrogating Khadr in circumstances of oppres-
sion is to say, in effect, that they breached fundamental justice by 
depriving him of security of the person.62 Second, the model proposed by 
the Court implies that had the interrogations been demonstrably fruitless, 
or had they yielded nothing new or relevant to eventual U.S. prosecution, 
Canadian officials would not have violated Khadr’s Charter rights. In-
deed, the final interrogation in 2004, performed with knowledge of prior 
torture, apparently produced no new or otherwise useful information; 
Khadr begged officials to help him instead of answering their questions. 
His requests and that interview were both futile. The Court’s focus on the 
putative contribution of the information to Khadr’s continued detention 
should lead to the conclusion that the 2004 interrogation did not violate 
his Charter rights. The Court slides over this troubling product of its own 
logic by adverting to Canadian officials’ prior knowledge of torture, 
while omitting the officials’ assessment that the interview was unproduc-
tive.63 
The problem is traceable to the fact that the Court unaccountably 
launches its Charter analysis in medias res, at the point where Canada 
shares information with the United States. From Charter application, to 
deprivation of liberty and security of the person, to the breach of funda-
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mental justice, the Court consistently regards the sharing of information 
with rights-violating U.S. authorities as the hub of the wrong, from 
which everything else radiates. Sharing information constituted participa-
tion in an unlawful U.S. regime; sharing information was causally 
connected to the ongoing deprivation of liberty and security of the person 
by U.S. authorities; the shared information was obtained in a manner that 
breached principles of fundamental justice, in part because of what the 
United States did to Omar Khadr prior to the Canadian interviews. The 
effect of this distorted legal narrative is to displace and deflect the con-
duct of Canadian officials to the margins of the analysis, and to deflect 
the question of Canadian culpability for deliberate choices about whether 
and how to engage with the options presented by the detention of a minor 
citizen in Guantánamo Bay. A few — but not all — elements of a possi-
ble response are sprinkled in the judgment, but since the Court never 
poses the question directly, it never answers it.  
Careful search for a principled basis for the Court’s analytical struc-
ture does not repay the effort. A superficially appealing rationale might 
be that the Charter analysis tracks the empirical fact that the United 
States, not Canada, is the primary perpetrator of the violations of Omar 
Khadr’s human rights. But to make the Charter analysis revolve around 
the contribution of information sharing to U.S. violations is to confuse an 
empirical with a legal analysis. The task of the Supreme Court of Canada 
is not to apportion factual causation or legal liability for rights violations 
as between Canada and the United States. It is the constitutional relation-
ship between Omar Khadr and Canada that matters here; the Charter 
does not regulate the relationship between Omar Khadr and the United 
States, or the relationship between Canada and the United States. The 
Court’s jurisdiction both permits and requires it to adjudicate the compli-
ance of the Canadian government with constitutional obligations binding 
upon it (and no other state), toward a single person (and no one else). 
It is difficult to find a label for this defect of judicial reasoning. The 
Court’s misrepresentation of the salient constitutional issue is perhaps 
best described as a failure of what U.S. constitutional theorist Lawrence 
Solum terms “constitutional vision”: 
In the context of constitutional adjudication, the virtue of justice 
requires the ability to perceive the salient features of particular 
situations. … [W]e might say that a sense of justice requires 
“constitutional vision,” the ability to size up a constitutional case and 
discern its constitutionally salient dimension. This requires an 
intellectual grasp of the content of the law, an understanding of the 
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underlying purposes the law serves, and an ability to pick out the 
features of particular cases that are important for those rules and 
purposes.64 
The Court’s job is to adjudicate the conduct of Canadian officials in 
relation to Omar Khadr as against the obligations imposed on Canadian 
actors by the Charter. Obviously, the context for that assessment includes 
the egregious and pervasive rights-violating regime operated by the 
United States, into which Canada inserted itself as participant. But if one 
begins from the question of Canada’s legal obligations under the Charter 
toward Omar Khadr, then it makes little sense to construe the Charter 
violation primarily in terms of information sharing.65 
One might not be overly troubled with how the Court formulates the 
threshold, liberty/security of the person violations and fundamental jus-
tice analyses respectively. Assembling a Charter violation from assorted 
spare parts culled from Hamdan, Khadr 2008 and Suresh may not actu-
ally produce a juridically coherent or stable machine, but if it works, 
perhaps it is best not to examine it too closely.66 After all, the Court does 
arrive with celerity at the conclusion that the Charter applies and section 
7 is violated, and so it might seem churlish to cavil about how they got 
there.  
Rather than belabour an internal critique of the reasoning, I want to 
pose a slightly different question: what work does the tight focus on in-
formation sharing do for the Court? Most obviously, it retains the 
emphasis on the U.S. as the perpetrator of rights violations against Khadr 
and on Canada as an ancillary player whose ostensibly benign action — 
sharing information — is tainted only in a contingent sense, depending 
on how it is used by the main perpetrator. This has two related effects. 
First, it supplements the Court’s apparent abstention from directing the 
government to provide a specific remedy for its unconstitutional conduct 
by pointing in the direction of a remedy focused on the fate of the evi-
                                                                                                             
64 Lawrence B. Solum, “The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory” (2005) 70 Brook. L. 
Rev. 475, at 518. See also SSRN, online <http://ssrn.com/abstract=512882> (at 34). 
65 Another explanation for the Court’s approach might invoke a crude path dependence: 
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dence. Second, it saps any potency from the Court’s express acknowl-
edgment than a request for repatriation “could potentially vindicate” 
Omar Khadr’s rights.67 
2. The Remedy 
The Court begins this section of its analysis by reviewing the re-
quirements for a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. It asks 
whether the remedy sought is “sufficiently connected to the breach”.68 
Information sharing lies at the core of the Court’s account of the Charter 
violation, but Khadr 2008 already ordered disclosure of that information. 
The government argued that the acquisition and sharing of information 
stopped in 2004 and the disclosure of that information to defence counsel 
pursuant to the order in Khadr 2008 obviates the need for further remedy. 
The Court responds by extending the Charter violation into the present. It 
states that, to the extent that the evidence may be used against Khadr in 
an eventual trial by the U.S., the “effect of the breaches cannot be said to 
have been spent”.69  
The best explanation for how it accomplishes this is that it treats 
Khadr 2008 as a Stinchcombe70 problem, familiar in the law of Canadian 
criminal procedure. The Crown has a duty to disclose relevant evidence 
— lawfully obtained or otherwise — to defence counsel, and a court will 
order disclosure if the Crown has breached its duty. In Khadr 2008, Can-
ada obtained evidence that could be used against Khadr in a trial, albeit 
in a U.S. trial, and so had to disclose it to defence counsel. Khadr 2010, 
in turn, raises the different problem of illegally obtained evidence, which 
was neither addressed nor resolved in Khadr 2008, partly because the 
evidence proving the illegality was only revealed as a result of the dis-
closure pursuant to Khadr 2008. This problem of illegally obtained 
evidence is typically resolved in Canadian law by exclusion of evidence 
from trial. Khadr 2010 thus becomes a section 24(2) problem. 
This implicit framing of the section 7 issues by the Court demon-
strates a methodological domestication of Khadr’s legal position in both 
senses of the word. First, it assimilates the rights violations occurring in 
Guantánamo Bay into the nearest local analogues within the Canadian 
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criminal justice system — non-disclosure by the Crown (Khadr 2008) 
and improperly obtained evidence (Khadr 2010). Second, it tames the 
rights violations by suppressing what it adverted to at the outset of the 
judgment: the very regime into which the Canadian officials enthusiasti-
cally inserted themselves as interrogators breaches fundamental norms of 
international law.  
Within a legal order that is presumptively compliant with the rule of 
law, rights violations are ex hypothesi aberrant. The rights violation can 
and must be remedied in order to restore the health of the system. The 
remedy closes the wound inflicted by the breach and enables the system 
to resume intact. That is a plausible account of the Canadian legal order, 
the civilian criminal justice system of the United States, and arguably 
even the ordinary courts martial systems of both states. It does not apply 
to the Military Commissions process in Guantánamo Bay; indeed, this 
legal fact is the foundation of the Court’s ruling that the Charter applies 
to Canadian officials in Guantánamo Bay. Illegality saturates the entire 
Military Commissions apparatus, from indefinite detention, to the inflic-
tion of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, to the 
mistreatment of minors, to the lack of judicial independence, to the con-
tent of retroactive (and ersatz) “war crimes”, to the trial process itself. 
Canadian officials in Guantánamo Bay did not participate in deviant 
rights-violating conduct; they engaged in rights-violating conduct that 
was entirely typical and constitutive of the Military Commission system. 
The evidence disclosed after Khadr 2008 proves they knew of the fre-
quent flier program. It is also plain from the transcript of their 
interactions with Khadr that he complained to them of torture. Only the 
most naive of observers could imagine that Canadian officials did not 
know or suspect that the frequent flier program was not the only torture, 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted on Khadr.  
The point is that one cannot transpose the remedy of evidence exclu-
sion at trial from a functional legal order to a dysfunctional legal regime. 
To suggest that the Charter breach persists as long as improperly ob-
tained evidence is admissible at trial presupposes that the trial would 
otherwise be lawful if inadmissible evidence were excluded. Yet, in no 
way could evidence exclusion at trial rescue the legality of a Military 
Commission proceeding.  
This domestication of the Charter breach appears particularly anoma-
lous next to the Court’s subsequent trepidation about judicial 
encroachment on the foreign affairs prerogative of the executive. But on 
reflection, the former serves the latter by belittling the remedial implica-
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tions flowing from a genuine recognition of the nature and scope of Ca-
nadian officials’ Charter violations, as well as the depth and breadth of 
the Military Commissions’ departure from international law and legality. 
The Court’s unwillingness to engage with any of the specific features of 
the Military Commissions regime that make it unlawful under interna-
tional law allows the character of the regime to slip from view once it has 
fulfilled its function in relation to Charter application. In combination 
with the section 7 analysis’ tight focus on the sharing of evidence, the 
Court creates the misleading impression that disclosure of evidence pre-
viously concealed (as in Khadr 2008) or exclusion of evidence 
improperly obtained (in Khadr 2010) are capable of providing complete 
remedies for discrete and self-contained wrongs in the Military Commis-
sions process to which Omar Khadr is subject. 
One might counter by conceding that any trial Khadr faces will be ir-
redeemably contaminated by the violations that preceded it and the 
violations entailed in the trial process itself. However, excluding evi-
dence shared by Canadian officials will wipe Canada’s fingerprints off 
the process. This, of course, revives the question of the validity of the 
Court’s characterization of the section 7 violation and the identification 
of information sharing as definitive and exhaustive of Canadian officials’ 
engagement with a section  7 interest. A constitutional remedy must be 
responsive to the violation, but a fractional depiction of the violation de-
mands less by way of remedial response than would a more complete 
account. The remedial landscape looks different if one takes seriously 
that the choice by Canadian officials to piggyback on U.S. violations by 
interrogating Khadr, as well as the actual conduct of those interrogations, 
violated Khadr’s Charter right to security of the person. Following this 
path necessarily leads to a broader characterization of Canadian complic-
ity that includes but is not limited to the violations entailed in 
information sharing.  
In 2009, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while counter-
ing terrorism and the U.K. House of Lords and House of Commons Joint 
Committee on Human Rights each addressed the issue of state complicity 
in human rights violations perpetrated by, inter alia, the United States in 
Guantánamo Bay.71 The House of Lords report is confined to complicity 
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in torture, but its definition of complicity would also apply more broadly 
to the panoply of egregious human rights violations to which Omar 
Khadr has been subject: 
[F]or the purposes of State responsibility for complicity in torture, 
however, “complicity” means simply one State giving assistance to 
another State in the commission of torture, or acquiescing in such 
torture, in the knowledge, including constructive knowledge, of the 
circumstances of the torture which is or has been taking place. 
. . . . . 
We are in no doubt that … the sending of interrogators to question a 
suspect who is being tortured and of observers to sit in on 
interrogations, are all forms of assistance and facilitation capable of 
amounting to complicity in torture by the State concerned when those 
things are done in the knowledge that the person concerned is being, 
has been or will be tortured by the State which is detaining him, or 
where that ought to be obvious to the State providing the assistance.72 
The word “complicity” appears nowhere in the Court’s section 7 
analysis in Khadr 2010, and it signifies the Court’s determination to 
avoid grappling substantively with the fundamental issue lying at the 
heart of this case. Had the Court addressed Canadian complicity in any 
meaningful sense, it would have been driven inexorably to an account of 
the section 7 breach that could not be remedied simply by exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence at a hypothetical future trial. A plausible 
account of the Charter violation would speak unequivocally to the need 
to seek Khadr’s repatriation. 
Identifying the interrogations as a direct violation of Khadr’s security 
of the person would have obviated the need to contrive a causal connec-
tion between the statements transferred by Canadian to U.S. authorities 
and the continuation of Khadr’s detention. It would also have shone a 
direct spotlight on the legality of the successive choices by Canadian of-
ficials about whether and how to act in relation to Omar Khadr’s 
detention and, specifically whether and how to exploit U.S. violations of 
                                                                                                             
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (February 4, 2009), at 
para. 55:  
The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that not only active participation in interrogations 
where people are tortured would constitute a violation of human rights law, but also tak-
ing advantage of the coercive environment. At a minimum, States which know or ought 
to know that they are receiving intelligence from torture or other inhuman treatment, or 
arbitrary detention, … are complicit in the human rights violations in question. 
72 Id., at paras. 35, 37. 
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his rights to Canadian advantage. In short, it would have framed the to-
tality of Canada’s actions and possibly inactions toward Omar Khadr in 
terms of complicity in the flagrant and egregious rights violations com-
mitted by the United States. 
Thus, the existence of a section 7 violation would not be contingent 
on how much or what kind of evidence was extracted, what was done 
with it, or how useful it was to the United States. That is not to deny that 
the sharing of evidence also constitutes a wrong, but rather to observe 
that it is not exhaustive of the rights violation. Therefore, it cannot define 
the extent of a remedy that will be responsive to the broader violation. 
And if the violation is not dependent on the sharing of evidence, then the 
continuity of the violation cannot depend entirely on the fate of that evi-
dence. Instead, the continuity of the violation would reside in the failure 
to take steps to remedy the violations committed by Canada through its 
complicity with the United States.  
If one attempted to understand the remedial issue through the lens of 
domestic analogues, more apposite examples exist than exclusion of evi-
dence for improperly obtained evidence: if Omar Khadr was in Canada, 
and the United States requested his extradition to face what he has en-
dured already and faces in the future before the Military Commissions 
apparatus, no Canadian court could conceivably authorize his surrender. 
Alternatively, if a Canadian court had jurisdiction over a trial of Omar 
Khadr, the sheer enormity and severity of the procedural and substantive 
rights violations already committed would constitute an abuse of process 
so massive that a judge would be compelled to stay the proceedings.73 
Obviously, Omar Khadr is not in Canada, and no Canadian court exer-
cises adjudicative jurisdiction over him. But within the existing 
jurisdictional constraints imposed by extraterritoriality, a request for re-
patriation is the functional equivalent of a refusal to surrender or a stay 
of proceedings. In other words, an appropriate remedy would be one di-
rected at terminating Khadr’s exposure to the process. Relevant Supreme 
Court of Canada jurisprudence sets the bar high for a stay of proceeding: 
an abuse of process will justify a stay only where  
                                                                                                             
73 Indeed, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice stayed the extradition of Abdullah Khadr 
(Omar’s brother) to the United States based on U.S. complicity in Abdullah’s treatment by Pakistani 
authorities. United States of America v. Khadr, [2010] O.J. No. 3301, 2010 ONSC 4338 (Ont. 
S.C.J.). 
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(1) the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, 
perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its 
outcome; and 
(2) no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that 
prejudice.74  
Using these criteria, one could hardly imagine a clearer case for a 
stay of proceedings or, by implication, its functional analogue in the cir-
cumstances, namely, a request for Omar Khadr’s repatriation to Canada. 
Rather than follow through on the implications of its own analysis 
and oblige the Prime Minister to request exclusion of evidence obtained 
by Canadian officials, the Court resiled from ordering any remedy.75 The 
Court invokes the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs to justify why 
the Court will declare that Canadian officials have violated Omar 
Khadr’s rights, but will not order the Prime Minister to do anything in 
particular about it. The prerogative refers to those powers reserved to the 
executive (formally, the Governor General; practically, the Prime Minis-
ter and the Cabinet) that the legislature has not (yet) circumscribed or 
supplanted. The perennial debate about the prerogative turns on whether, 
in Dicey’s words, the “residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority … 
legally left in the hands of the Crown”,76 is accountable in substance to 
the rule of law and institutionally to the courts on judicial review.  
The Court’s analysis can best be summarized as a Canadian  
performance of what, in U.K. jurisprudence, legal scholar Thomas 
Poole dubs the “prerogative two-step”:  
 [S]tep 1, the refusal to countenance the idea of a gap in the normal 
framework of the law and the assertion that ordinary principles 
apply to prerogative law-making; 
 Step 2, the accommodation of government interests (‘act of state’; 
‘national security’) and equivocation or uncertainty in the 
application of those principles.77 
In Step 1, the Court gestures in the direction of its own dicta, to the 
effect that the “executive is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny”, 
                                                                                                             
74 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 75 (S.C.C.). See also 
R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 54 (S.C.C.). 
75 Although as I argue below, the Court’s s. 7 analysis hints at the minimum that the gov-
ernment can get away with doing. 
76 Quoted in Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at para. 34. 
77 Thomas Poole, “Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power and the Prerogative” (2010) 
60 U.T.L.J. 81, at 103. 
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citing Operation Dismantle.78 It gestures broadly at the rule of law in a 
constitutional democracy wherein “all government power must be exer-
cised in accordance with the Constitution”.79  
Consistent with Poole’s depiction of the U.K. courts, the Court does 
not formally repudiate its earlier jurisprudence and replace it with a U.S. 
style political question doctrine that immunizes foreign relations from 
judicial scrutiny. On the contrary, the Court cites the extradition case of 
Burns for the proposition that “in the case of refusal by a government to 
abide by constitutional constraints, courts are empowered to make orders 
ensuring that the government’s foreign affairs prerogative is exercised in 
accordance with the constitution”.80 In Burns, the Court ordered the Min-
ister of Justice to seek assurances that the death penalty would neither be 
sought nor imposed on a fugitive as a precondition to extradition. 
In Step 2, the Court bows to its executive partner in the separation of 
powers: each assertion of the rule of law in Step 1 is met with the equal 
and opposite assertion in Step 2 that the executive possesses the authority 
and the expertise over the conduct of foreign relations. The government 
is “better placed [than the judiciary] to make such decisions within a 
range of constitutional options” and must retain “flexibility in deciding 
how its duties under the power are to be discharged”.81 
The Court diffuses the tension by retaining the substantive idea that 
the executive prerogative must be exercised in conformity with the Char-
ter, and jettisoning the Court’s institutional responsibility for ensuring 
that it does so. This in turns requires a means of rationalizing why the 
Court should resile from its remedial jurisdiction in this case, unlike prior 
cases. The judgment relies explicitly on two traditional jurisprudential 
techniques for isolating and distinguishing Khadr’s situation.  
First, it distinguishes its precedent in Burns in the following concise 
passage: 
The specific facts in Burns justified a more specific remedy. The 
fugitives were under the control of Canadian officials. It was clear that 
assurances would provide effective protection against the prospective 
Charter breaches: it was entirely within Canada’s power to protect the 
fugitives against possible execution. Moreover, the Court noted that no 
public purpose would be served by extradition without assurances that 
would not be substantially served by extradition with assurances, and 
                                                                                                             
78 Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at para. 36. 
79 Id., at para. 37. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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that there was nothing to suggest that seeking such assurances would 
undermine Canada’s good relations with other states: Burns, at paras. 
125 and 136.  
The present case differs from Burns. Mr. Khadr is not under the control 
of the Canadian government; the likelihood that the proposed remedy 
will be effective is unclear; and the impact on Canadian foreign 
relations of a repatriation request cannot be properly assessed by the 
Court.82 
The Court here indulges in the classic tactic of invoking a distinction 
without a difference. Burns was under the control of Canadian officials, 
whereas Khadr is not. True, but so what? The Court seems to attach sig-
nificance to the fact that Canada can fully protect fugitives from the 
death penalty by securing assurances, or by refusing to extradite in the 
absence of assurances. In Khadr’s case, Canada can only protect him if 
the U.S. agrees to repatriate. With neither warning nor explanation, the 
Court here introduces a legal rule for constitutional remedies that the per-
fect shall be the enemy of the good: an effective remedy is one that fully 
vindicates the rights of the individual; therefore, the Court should do 
nothing rather than grant a remedy that may only have that effect. This 
would seem inconsistent with any plausible account of the Court’s reme-
dial jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter. Remedial efficacy 
must be calibrated to the options available where the state enjoys nation-
ality but not territorial jurisdiction over the person concerned.  
A deeper flaw in the reasoning is that the Court conflates the U.S. 
violations of Khadr’s international human rights with Canada’s violation 
of his Charter rights. A request for repatriation may indeed fail to termi-
nate U.S. violations if the request is refused, but the task is to conclude 
Canada’s ongoing complicity in those rights violations. Of course, the 
open secret is that the Canadian government does not fear that a genuine 
repatriation request, made in good faith, with a view to negotiating a mu-
tually acceptable outcome, will cause friction with a recalcitrant United 
States; what the government has really and realistically feared all along is 
that the request would be granted. The risk that the Prime Minister would 
not execute his legal duty in good faith, and that the Court would be 
called upon to engage in the task of evaluating executive compliance, 
hardly amounts to an intrusion into executive conduct of foreign affairs 
so inevitable as to warrant pre-emptive denial of the remedy. 
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The Court’s reference to public purpose is directed at the specific 
remedy of repatriation (as opposed to judicial constraints on the foreign 
affairs prerogative), but beyond that, it is ambiguous. The Court does not 
identify a public purpose that would be served by refusing to request 
Khadr’s repatriation. In Kindler,83 the government successfully argued 
that mandatory assurances created a pressing and substantial risk that 
“Canada might become a safe haven for criminals in the United States 
seeking to avoid the death penalty”.84 Less than a decade later, the Court 
in Burns repudiated what the Kindler dissent described as an “in terrorem 
argument put forward without any evidentiary basis”.85 In Khadr 2010, 
the government made no submissions, tendered no evidence and received 
no questions from the bench about any public purpose that would be 
served by denying Khadr a judicial remedy. The Court did not ask the 
government to explain why it refused to request repatriation, and the 
government supplied no reasons for its refusal to request repatriation.86  
The Court remarks that there was no evidence in Burns to suggest 
that requests for death penalty assurances would damage foreign rela-
tions with the United States, whereas the Court in Khadr 2010 was 
putatively unable to properly assess the impact of a repatriation request 
on Canada-U.S. relations. The evidence before the Court in Burns was 
that other countries systematically requested and obtained death penalty 
assurances prior to extradition, and Canada had twice requested and 
twice obtained such assurances, with no adverse diplomatic conse-
quences. The evidence before the Court in Khadr 2010 was that all other 
Western states had already requested and obtained repatriation of their 
citizens (and even permanent residents). The Court’s precedent in Burns 
belies rather than supports its institutional incapacity to assess the diplo-
matic impact of a request for repatriation. The government adduced no 
evidence indicating that a request for repatriation would damage diplo-
matic relations and, as the Federal Court of Appeal observed “when 
                                                                                                             
83 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 
(S.C.C.). 
84 Id., at para. 188. 
85 Id., at para. 112. 
86 If the public purpose is to subject Omar Khadr to “justice” before a U.S. court, the 
Court’s starting proposition that the entire Military Commission apparatus constitutes a breach of 
international humanitarian law, invalidates that purpose. If the public purpose is to obstruct Omar 
Khadr’s return to his country of citizenship in the name of Canadian security, the Court chose not to 
validate it explicitly, leaving it instead as a blank to be filled in by the workings of a post-September 
11 imagination. Of course, the Supreme Court of Canada has travelled down this road in Suresh, 
supra, note 57, at para. 78, where it concluded that in exceptional circumstances, it may be constitu-
tionally permissible for a non-citizen to be deported to face a serious risk of torture. 
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pressed in oral argument, counsel for the Crown conceded that the 
Crown was not alleging that requiring Canada to make such a request 
would damage its relations with the United States”.87 
The Court’s professed inability to assess the evidence before it se-
gues smoothly into its second concern, namely, the inadequacy of the 
evidentiary record. Here, the Court emphasizes that it possesses an “in-
complete picture of the range of considerations currently faced by the 
government in assessing Mr. Khadr’s request”.88 According to the Court, 
Khadr is trapped on unstable and shifting legal terrain, and the Court is 
ignorant of past and ongoing negotiations between Canada and the 
United States in relation to his evolving “legal predicament”.89 These 
factors “signal caution in the exercise of the Court’s remedial jurisdic-
tion”.90 
The Court does not indicate why it would be impossible or inappro-
priate for the government to furnish an adequate evidentiary record 
because of diplomatic or foreign relations concerns. Nor does it elaborate 
on what the Court would need to know about the range of considerations 
at play. One wonders if it overstates the inadequacy of the record, given 
the fact that every other U.S. ally successfully obtained repatriation of its 
citizens (and, in some cases, permanent residents). More importantly, for 
the Court to cite the inadequacy of the record as a reason to deny a rem-
edy, when the government alone is responsible for this deficiency, is to 
reward the government for withholding evidence. This seems perverse. 
This attention to the record seems like a diversionary tactic in any 
case. The situation of other Canadians abroad seeking Canada’s assis-
tance may raise a range of potential considerations and possible 
responses, but the Court could easily and appropriately have confined its 
examination to the specific facts of Khadr’s case: The Court knew 
enough of the facts to make a finding that the Canadian government is 
violating his Charter rights. Khadr asked the Canadian government to 
request his repatriation, the government refused, and Khadr sought a ju-
dicial remedy that would compel the government to seek his return.  
                                                                                                             
87 Supra, note 10, at para. 59. One cannot but suspect that a combined in personem, in ter-
rorem argument (“Omar Khadr is a terrorist, and his presence in Canada would jeopardize national 
security”) is so powerful that the government need not (indeed could not) utter it in order for the 
Court to succumb to it. 
88 Khadr 2010, supra, note 3, at para. 44. 
89 Id., at para. 45. 
90 Id. 
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For purposes of exercising remedial discretion, the relevant “un-
known” in the record before the Court was not evidence but reasons. 
Why did the Prime Minister refuse to request repatriation? The script, 
from which the government never strays, declares only that “Omar 
Khadr faces very serious charges, including murder, attempted murder, 
conspiracy, material support for terrorism, and spying. The Government 
of Canada continues to provide consular services to Mr. Khadr.” These 
are not reasons.  
Before the Court, the government took the position that the decision 
to refuse to seek Khadr’s repatriation fell outside the purview of constitu-
tional review; in oral argument, the government disavowed any 
obligation to explain the refusal. After all, if the Charter does not hold 
government accountable for how it exercises the foreign affairs preroga-
tive, principles of legality should not require the government to justify 
when, why or how it exercises that power.  
The Court evidently rejected the proposition of unfettered and unac-
countable executive prerogative for purposes of constitutional review, yet 
neglected to consider an ensuing burden of justification on the govern-
ment at the remedial stage. The Supreme Court of Canada has, for over a 
decade, oriented its administrative law doctrine toward a “culture of jus-
tification” as a normative touchstone for testing the legality of 
government action.91 Thus, in Baker, the Supreme Court of Canada rec-
ognized a common law procedural duty to give reasons for decisions 
where important individual interests were at stake.92 In Dunsmuir, the 
Court ruled that when judicially reviewing the substance of a decision, be 
it the exercise of discretion or the application of a legal rule, a court 
should examine the existence of “justification, transparency and intelli-
gibility within the decision-making process”, in addition to evaluating 
the outcome itself.93 In 1999, McLachlin C.J.C. elaborated on her under-
standing of the connection between the rule of law and a culture of 
justification as follows:  
Where a society is marked by a culture of justification, an exercise of 
public power is only appropriate where it can be justified to citizens in 
                                                                                                             
91 The phrase comes from South African scholar Etienne Mureinik, but the concept is most 
associated with, and most thoroughly elaborated by, David Dyzenhaus. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, 
“Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture” (1998) 14 S.A.H.R. 11. 
92 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 35-44 (S.C.C.). 
93 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47 
(S.C.C.). 
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terms of rationality and fairness. ... Rule by fiat is unaccepted. … 
Indeed, most importantly, the ability to call for such a justification as a 
precondition to the legitimate exercise of public power is regarded by 
citizens as their right, a right which only illegitimate institutions and 
laws venture to infringe. The prevalence of such a cultural expectation 
is, in my view, the definitive marker of a mature Rule of Law.94 
In Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada imposed upon the Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration a reasons requirement in relation to a 
decision to deport a non-citizen deemed a threat to national security back 
to a country where he would face a substantial risk of torture.95 So, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s dicta sustain Charter accountability for the 
exercise of the foreign affairs prerogative and a duty upon Ministers to 
give reasons for the exercise of statutory discretion. One could thereby 
infer that a prerogative decision by a Minister to abandon a citizen to a 
regime that has already subjected that citizen to torture, and/or cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment, and which intends to subject him to an 
unfair trial, would attract no less a requirement of principled reasons.96 In 
the context of a section 24(1) remedy, the fact that the government of-
fered neither reasons for its refusal to request repatriation, nor a proposal 
of an alternative remedy, would logically support a negative inference 
against the government. The absence of justification for denial of the 
remedy should operate as a factor militating in favour of granting the 
remedy sought. The Court’s reliance upon the inadequacy of the eviden-
tiary record as a factor militating against any remedial order has it 
precisely backwards. 
It requires no effort to understand the political motivation behind the 
government’s preference for letting Omar Khadr languish in Guantánamo 
Bay. Why request the return of a man whose surname is synonymous with 
                                                                                                             
94 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in 
Maintaining the Rule of Law” (1998-99) 12 C.J.A.L.P. 171, at 174. 
95 Suresh, supra, note 57, at para. 126:  
The Minister must provide written reasons for her decision. These reasons must articulate 
and rationally sustain a finding that there are no substantial grounds to believe that the 
individual who is the subject of a s. 53(1)(b) declaration will be subjected to torture, exe-
cution or other cruel or unusual treatment, so long as the person under consideration has 
raised those arguments. The reasons must also articulate why, subject to privilege or valid 
legal reasons for not disclosing detailed information, the Minister believes the individual 
to be a danger to the security of Canada as required by the Act. In addition, the reasons 
must also emanate from the person making the decision, in this case the Minister. ... 
96 I mean by this that reasons based on self-regarding political interests of elected officials 
would not satisfy the requirement of reasoned justification. One could also refer to this as “public 
reason”. 
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terrorism? However, articulating legally valid reasons for inertia in the face 
of grotesque and ongoing human rights violations is rather more difficult. 
Indeed, the inability to discharge the burden of justification is the sole 
means by which the Suresh exception (permitting deportation to torture “in 
exceptional circumstances”) has been neutralized in practice: the govern-
ment has been unable to come up with reasons capable of satisfying a 
court that the severity or nature of the national security risk posed to Can-
ada by a specific non-citizen in a given case warrants deporting that person 
to a substantial risk of torture.97 The Prime Minister’s calculus is thor-
oughly comprehensible within a realist account of role morality. The Court 
in Khadr 2010 permits the government to indulge these impulses by ex-
empting the government from the requirement to justify its rights 
violations. Since the Court has elsewhere indicated that the culture of justi-
fication encompasses the executive in relation to the Charter, even in 
matters of foreign relations, the only other available explanation is that 
Omar Khadr is undeserving of reasons: he resides outside of the culture of 
justification, somewhere in the state of exception.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court stated in R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. (and reiterated in 
Doucet-Boudreau98) that “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is 
only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach”.99 One might 
transpose the point to say that the Court’s declaration that Omar Khadr’s 
Charter rights are being breached, no matter how sincere in theory, is 
only as meaningful as the remedy it engenders.  
Although the Court coyly insisted that it was leaving the choice of 
remedial options to the executive, legal commentators in the media were 
instantly able to connect the dots between the Court’s account of the sec-
tion 7 violation and a remedy consisting of a request for exclusion of 
Canadian evidence from the Military Commission proceedings. It was, 
therefore, predictable that the Canadian government would eventually 
deliver such a request to the United States government. It was equally 
predictable that the U.S. government would reject it. After all, attempting 
                                                                                                             
97 See Re Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1706, 2006 FC 1230 (F.C.), per Mackay J. (no excep-
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to tamper with the trial process of another state (by excluding evidence 
that the judge would otherwise deem admissible) constitutes a signifi-
cantly greater intrusion into the sovereignty of another state than a 
request from one executive branch to another to repatriate the accused 
before a trial commences.100 So, a remedy consisting of a request for the 
exclusion of evidence managed — predictably — to be both unrespon-
sive and ineffective from Khadr’s perspective, and unacceptable from the 
U.S. perspective. This is not an undesirable outcome for a government 
with no political motive to do anything that might benefit, or even appear 
to benefit, Omar Khadr.101 The videotape of Canadian officials’ interroga-
tion of Khadr at Guantánamo Bay was entered into evidence at a pre-trial 
hearing before the Military Commission in May 2010. 
A more sympathetic reader of the Court’s judgment in Khadr 2010 
might defend the decision as an exemplar of Cass Sunstein’s model of 
judicial minimalism, whereby the Court decided the case in appropriately 
narrow and shallow terms, leaving it to the executive to determine a suit-
able appropriate course of action.102 For instance, the Court did not 
indicate what role (if any) Khadr’s citizenship played in the existence or 
scope of the Charter obligations owed to him. The Court adverted to the 
fact that he is a citizen, but his status did not do any explicit normative 
work in the judgment. The Court thus avoided ruling on the relevance of 
citizenship. One might endorse the Court’s reticence, and insist that reso-
lution should await a case actually involving non-citizens, but for the fact 
that the Court denied leave in two cases involving appellants denied ex-
traterritorial Charter protection on precisely that basis.103 
                                                                                                             
100 Even a request for assurances that the death penalty neither be sought nor imposed as a 
precondition to extradition does not purport to interfere in the process by which guilt or innocence is 
determined. 
101 Since Omar Khadr was interrogated hundreds of times by U.S. officials, it seems unlikely 
that the Canadian interviews yielded relevant evidence otherwise unavailable to U.S. prosecutors.  
102 Sunstein, supra, note 66; Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War” (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 47. 
103 As it happens, the Afghan detainee case, among others, raised precisely that issue. Unlike 
Khadr, the public interest applicants in each case failed before the Federal Court and the Federal 
Court of Appeal, in part on the grounds that the Charter did not protect the detainees qua non-
citizens. Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff), [2008] F.C.J. No. 
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(Minister of Justice), [2009] F.C.J. No. 1120, 2009 FCA 259 (F.C.A.) (Charter does not apply to 
non-citizens interrogated by Canadian officials at Guantanámo Bay), leave to appeal refused Febru-
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18.3.html>. Alexander Bickel’s account of the “passive virtues” (whereby courts decide not to decide 
certain cases or issues) provides the vehicle for Kent Roach’s insightful and helpful analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s denial of leave in the Afghan detainee case and the denial of the remedy 
328 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The judgment in Khadr 2010 also avoids the question of whether 
Canada owes a positive duty under section 7 of the Charter to protect its 
citizens — including citizens abroad — and the contours and scope of 
any such duty. Again, a predilection for minimalism can explain the 
Court’s silence. Since Canadian officials had affirmatively acted by inter-
rogating Khadr in Guantánamo Bay, the Court could confine its inquiry 
to whether the conduct constituted a Charter violation. In order to resolve 
the case, the Court did not have to rule on whether Canada would also 
have violated Khadr’s Charter rights had it simply chosen not to inter-
vene in any way while the United States violated his rights.  
Whatever the merits of judicial minimalism as a theory of constitu-
tional adjudication, minimalism is ultimately unhelpful in characterizing 
(or defending) the remedial portion of the judgment. As I have argued, 
the Court’s express acknowledgment that a repatriation request would be 
a viable remedy, as well as its abstention from imposing a remedy, both 
mask the remedy invited by the section 7 analysis. This complicates an 
attempt to describe the Court’s handling of the remedial issue in the sim-
plified typology of minimalism versus maximalism. 
From another vantage point, one might also recognize the Khadr 
2010 judgment as creating what David Dyzenhaus describes as a legal 
“grey hole”, which he defines as: 
a legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive 
action — it is not a lawless void — but the constraints are so 
insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases. 
In addition, since such grey holes permit government to have its cake 
and eat it too, to seem to be governing not only by law but in 
accordance with the rule of law, they and their endorsement by judges 
and academics might be even more dangerous from the perspective of 
the substantive conception of the rule of law than true black holes.104  
Here is how the judgment in Khadr 2010 creates a “grey hole”: first, 
the Court insists that the Charter does apply to Canadian officials in 
Guantánamo Bay. Second, it devises a section 7 analysis capable of ex-
truding a specious remedy in the form of a request for evidence 
exclusion. Third, it issues a declaration of unconstitutionality, while indi-
cating that it expects the government to take some kind of unspecified 
                                                                                                             
in Khadr. See Kent Roach, “The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics: The Afghan Detainee and 
Omar Khadr Cases” (National Journal of Constitutional Law, forthcoming). 
104 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 42. Elsewhere (at 50), Dyzenhaus observes that a grey 
hole is in substance a black hole.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)   COMMENT ON CANADA (PRIME MINISTER) v. KHADR 329 
remedial action. After all, the rule of law binds the executive, even if a 
Court declines to use its authority to enforce it. The Court thus lets the 
government have its cake and eat it too: the executive can claim to be 
rule of law compliant because it has provided a remedy in the face of a 
declaration of unconstitutionality, even though not compelled to do so by 
court order. And it does not have to request Omar Khadr’s repatriation.  
Khadr 2010 exposes the dual character of the Supreme Court of 
Canada as a forum of principle and as an actor in institutional politics. 
The conventional wisdom is that as the events of September 11 recede, 
Anglo-European courts grow more willing to cast critical judgment on 
the executive’s extravagant assertions that the war on terror and protect-
ing national security trumps human rights. But the track record of the 
Supreme Court of Canada post-September 11 is consistent in its relative 
timidity: wherever possible, the Supreme Court of Canada has resolved 
constitutional challenges on procedural grounds105 and evaded any sub-
stantive determination of unconstitutionality. In 2002, the Court did not 
prohibit deportation to torture;106 in 2007, it did not prohibit indefinite 
detention;107 and in 2010, it refused to issue a meaningful remedy for a 
citizen who was both tortured and indefinitely detained.  
In Khadr 2010, the Court was asked to assert its jurisdiction to re-
trieve the most fundamental human rights of a single vilified individual 
from forfeiture by the institutions of majoritarian politics. No doubt the 
Prime Minister would have sharply criticized the Court had it actually 
done so, and some segment of the Canadian population would have 
agreed with the Prime Minister. Perhaps the Prime Minister would have 
flouted a Court’s order to request repatriation, and with it the executive’s 
fidelity to the rule of law. Or maybe not. We will never know. The only 
things we know for certain are that the government can act and will not 
(unless compelled by external pressure), the Supreme Court of Canada 
could have compelled the government to act and did not, and Omar 
Khadr’s rights are still being violated. For purposes of Canadian law, 
Khadr has been buried in the mother of all legal grey holes, the place of 
right without remedy. And a legal grey hole is really little more than a 
black hole decorated with judicial wallpaper. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
On July 5, 2010, Zinn J. of the Federal Court ruled that the govern-
ment did not accord Omar Khadr procedural fairness in responding to his 
request for repatriation.108 He ordered the government to advise Khadr 
within seven days of “all untried remedies that it maintains would poten-
tially cure or ameliorate its breach of Mr. Khadr’s Charter rights”.109 The 
government announced that it would appeal the order. Against Khadr’s 
rapidly approaching trial before the Military Commission, Blais C.J. of 
the Federal Court of Appeal granted a stay of enforcement of Zinn J.’s 
remedy. Chief Justice Blais stated, “I have no hesitation to conclude that 
the balance of convenience and the interest of justice favor the [Prime 
Minister’s]” interests in protecting incursion into the executive preroga-
tive over foreign relations.110 On September 24, 2010, Stratas J.A. of the 
Federal Court of Appeal denied an application to expedite the appeal 
from Zinn J.’s judgment in order that it be heard before the scheduled 
resumption of the Military Commission trial on October 18, 2010.111  
The actual resumption of the Military Commission trial was delayed 
until October 25, 2010. Plea negotiations occurring prior to resumption 
led to Omar Khadr pleading guilty to all charges when the trial resumed. 
The terms of the plea negotiation apparently contemplate an eight-year 
sentence. He will spend an additional year imprisoned in Guantánamo 
Bay, and then serve the remainder of his sentence in a Canadian prison. 
As of the date of writing, Canada officially denies its cooperation in a 
plea deal, and the diplomatic notes exchanged between Canada and the 
United States have not yet been publicly disclosed. 
Canada’s actual commitment to transfer Khadr to a Canadian prison 
will prove crucial, as the current Canadian government has refused re-
quests by Canadian prisoners in foreign prisons for transfer to Canadian 
prisons even where the detaining state consents. The constitutionality of 
these refusals is currently before the courts, and legislation has been in-
troduced to give the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness even wider and less accountable discretion to refuse re-
quests.112 One suspects that litigation will be required to effectuate timely 
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compliance by the current Canadian government with any undertaking 
regarding Omar Khadr. If so, it seems likely that the Federal Court, the 
Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada will once 
again confront the choice between institutional self-interest and fidelity 
to the rule of law. One hopes that all courts — including and especially 
the Supreme Court of Canada — will make the principled choice. 
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